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1 In his recent book The Pragmatic Turn,  Richard J.  Bernstein writes that a philosopher
comes alive and speaks to us from the past when his work becomes a fertile source for
dealing with current philosophical problems, when his work can be engaged in novel
ways. In what is to follow, I would like focus on the question of how the philosophy of
pragmatism can possibly  contribute  to  current  discussions  concerning  the  nature  of
cognition instigated by recent findings in cognitive science. I will also try to show that, in
many respects, contemporary cognitive neuroscience has been arriving at conclusions
reached long ago by two representatives of the Chicago school of pragmatism – George H.
Mead and John Dewey. At the same time, I will attempt to view their work through the
prism of these new findings. The way I am going to proceed in this paper will be the
following: First, I am going to examine the methodological starting points of these two
thinkers in their inquiries into the nature of cognition. On the background of these, I am
going  to  take  a  closer  look  at  some  pragmatic  ramifications  of  recent  research  in
particular areas of cognitive neuroscience. Second, elaborating on Mead’s theory of the
act (with its four stages – impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation) I will
point to numerous striking similarities between the pragmatists’ treatment of the notion
of cognition and ideas recently suggested by defenders of the extended mind theory. As a
point  of  transition between the first  and the second step,  I  am going to  present  an
argument in favor of a possible pragmatic redefinition of the notion of representation,
originally formulated by one of the advocates of the extended mind theory.
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Cognition As An Organic Unity – Dewey’s Criticism Of
The Reflex Arc Concept
2 Where specifically does cognition stop and action begin? Traditionally, philosophers (and
to date also the majority of cognitive scientists) have tended to think of the relation
between perception, action, and cognition in terms of what Susan Hurley once dubbed
the  “classical  sandwich”  paradigm.  In  her  words,  “this  conception  of  the  mind,
widespread across philosophy and empirical sciences of the mind, regards perception as
input  from  world  to  mind,  action  as  output  from  mind  to  world,  and  cognition  as
sandwiched  between”  (Hurley  2008:  2).  In  this  methodological  view,  cognition  is
considered some sort of a central process, taking place in our skulls, which transforms
and  processes  perceptual  inputs  caused  by  the  contingencies  of  our  environmental
surroundings. Action, on the other hand, is usually viewed as some sort of a “servant” to
the central cognitive processes, that is, as their mere bodily-instrumental output. At a
certain level of analysis the problem of the relation between perception and action can be
defined as a problem of the relation between stimulus and response. The main contention
of psychological research in Dewey’s time was that, if we are to explain what cognition is,
we  first  have  to  give  an  account of  the  process  by  which  perceptual  inputs  are
transformed  into  motor  action.  Everything  that  happens  in  between  can  be  called
cognition.  Hence,  in  order  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  central  process,  we  have  to
examine  how  the  peripheral  processes  are  transformed  into  one  another.  However
reasonable such a position may seem, Dewey’s seminal 1896 paper The Reflex Arc Concept in
Psychology1 considers such an outlook on the nature of cognition to be deeply misleading.2
In this paper Dewey executes a thoroughgoing critique of psychological methodologies
that  have  found  their  goal  in  the  program  of  establishing  causal  and  nomological
relations between stimuli and responses. Within this view, perceptual stimuli are taken to
be independent sensory particulars which trigger in the organism cognitive processes
that eventually lead to a motor discharge as a consequence of this processing. The crucial
problem with such a heuristic approach is that it tends to apprehend external stimuli,
internal processing, and external response as ontologically independent entities, clearly
delimited from one another. Under this analysis, Dewey writes:
The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, standing for the idea, and
the motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result, the reflex
arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjointed parts, a
mechanical conjunction of unallied processes. (EW 5: 97)
3 Drawing upon an example of a child seeing a candle introduced first by James in the
second chapter of his Psychology, Dewey illustrates the practical working of the reflex arc
mechanism. The situation is that of a small child that, after seeing a burning candle in her
vicinity  for  the  first  time,  reaches  out  to  its  flame  and  gets  burned.  The  ordinary
interpretation of that situation from the viewpoint of the reflex arc theory would hold
that the sensory datum of a light serves as a stimulus to the child, leading eventually to
the execution of a motor response in the form of trying to grasp the flame. The resulting
burn is, subsequently, a stimulus to withdrawing the hand and so on. Dewey argues that
the basic defect of such a theory is the idea of the possibility of dividing the unity of
human action into ontologically and temporally separated units. In other words, Dewey’s
main dissatisfaction with the clas- sical construal of the reflex arc concept lies in the fact
that it has misdirected the attention of psychologists from the real issue of trying to
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understand the phenomenon of human action to an exclusive focus upon the parts or
stages of the action (cf. Campbell 1995: 34). Whenever we try to divide experience or
action  into  ontologically  distinct  pieces,  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  put  them back
together again.  The traditional reflex arc concept, thus,  has to be replaced by a new
heuristic approach in which the stimulus, central reaction, and motor response are taken
merely as functional moments of larger organic unity of action:
Upon  analysis,  we  find  that  we  begin  not  with  a  sensory  stimulus,  but  with  a
sensori-motor co-ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the
movement which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the movement
of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In
other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a
sensation  of  light.  The  sensory  quale  gives  the  value  of  the  act,  just  as  the
movement furnishes its mechanism and control, but both sensation and movement
lie inside, not outside the act. (EW 5: 97)
4 What Dewey urges us to do here is to shift our focus from seeing the child as a simple
stimulus-response  mechanism  to  an  embodied  creature  situated  in  an  environment,
trying to achieve specific goals. That is why in order to understand human action we have
to start with “larger co-ordination” of the live creature engaging in purposeful action and
interacting with its environment. In such a picture, Dewey holds “the act is seeing no less
than before, but it is now seeing-for-reaching purposes. There is still a sensori-motor
circuit, one with more content or value” (EW 5: 98). As Leszek Koczanowicz has observed,
the act of coordination is for Dewey the only psychological reality (cf. Koczanowicz 1990:
49). The new methodological approach in psychology, proposed by Dewey, enabled not
only him, but more importantly Mead, to introduce into psychology the notion of action
as a unit of inquiry. Conscious action always starts as a goal-directed activity that engages
the whole organism. What should be emphasized at this point is that in Dewey’s view the
action-goals are present in the acts from their very beginning; and they fulfill there at
least  two  crucial  roles.  They  are,  first,  instigators  of  action  and,  second,  regulatory
elements  directing  sensori-motor  capacities  of  the  organism  towards  successful
completion of the act. Initially, the child sees the candle as a plaything which leads her to
reach out to its flame. The sensory stimulus of the candle, however, not only serves as an
initial element or cause of action, but also plays an important role during the motor act of
reaching  itself  as  it  regulates  the  movement  of  the  hand,  etc.  On  the  flipside,  the
movement  of  the  child  may  modify  the  sensory  stimuli  coming  to  her  perceptual
apparatus: “the sole meaning of the intervening movement is to maintain, reinforce or
transform (as the case may be) the original quale” (EW 5: 99). As simple a process as the
one of reaching out to a candle may seem, in Dewey’s view it cannot be depicted as a mere
stimulus-processing-response  chain.  Rather,  it  in-  volves  quite  a  sophisticated
mechanism of creating what Andy Clark calls “action-perception loops” (e.g. Clark 2008:
71, 74-75). In other words, according to Dewey, in the process of cognition, perception is
not separable from action for it controls the process of action as a goal-directed behavior
from the very beginning until its successful completion. By the same token, action, i. e. its
motor component, oftentimes transforms the character of perceptual experience.
5 Through motion the active organism continuously affects the character of its perceptual
experience, just as the character of perceptual experience affects the ways in which the
organism moves. In the process of cognition, therefore, the organism and the world enter
into what Clark calls continuous reciprocal causation, which occurs when some system is
both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by activity in some other
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system (cf.  Clark  2008:  24).3 Cognition,  Dewey  holds,  is  a  goal-directed  activity  of  a
physically embodied and environmentally embedded creature. At the most basic level,
cognition is not inherently contentful or intentional (in the classical Brentano’s sense),
rather the process of life as such, if we interpret it as a process of continuous organic
adjustment,  is  a  process  of  cognition.  In  this  fundamental  conviction,  the  Chicago
pragmatists anticipated contemporary systems theory as represented, for instance, in the
work  of  Humberto  Maturana:  “Living  systems  are  cognitive  systems  and  living  as  a
process is a process of cognition. This statement is correct for all  organisms, with or
without nervous system” (Maturana & Varela 1980: 13). The division of the continuum of
human perception and action into stimuli and responses is, therefore, an artificial one. In
this regard, Joas remarks: “according to Dewey, unless we make an anticipatory judgment
about the action in which stimuli and responses are joined together, we can speak only of
a temporal succession and not of the causal relation implied by the stimulus-response
model”  (Joas  1985:  66).  From  the  methodological  point  of  view,  Dewey’s  pragmatic
understanding of action as a value-laden and goal-directed activity4 necessarily precedes
its subsequent functional division into stimuli and responses (cf. EW 5: 96-105). The child
perceptually detects the flame in the first place because she sees it as something to be
played with, which is why she executes a series of more or less skillful bodily movements
to change the character of the experienced candle from being merely present into being
available.
6 What does this mean from the perspective of inquiry into the nature of action? I am
convinced that there are at least two crucial points to be drawn from the naturalistic
accounts of cognition of the Chicago pragmatists. First and foremost, as Kilpinen recently
remarked,  in pragmatism “action is  a  universal  phenomenon which in itself  begs no
explanation but rather makes the starting point for explanations”5 (Kilpinen 2008: 1).
Secondly,  in  light  of  this  strictly  naturalistic  approach  to  cognition  we  cannot
consistently try to explain it solely in terms of what is going on in our heads. In contrast
to mainstream philosophy of mind, pragmatists do not take the mind or its capacity for
cognition as self-contained puzzles but rather as phenomena which evolved to “make
things happen” (Clark 1997a: 1), to guide action and enable more effective coping with
the environment.  In short,  the brain is  an organ for controlling the biological  body,
rather than a disembodied logical reasoning device. In pragmatism, the explanation of
action thus both genealogically and heuristically precedes the explanation of mind and
high-order cognitive processes.
7 In Deweyan perspective, the basic characteristics of experience understood in terms of
skillful attunement to the world and its implicit practical understanding have to be taken
into consideration if  we want to analyze the child’s action.6 As Alva Noë once put it:
“perception is not something that happens to us or in us. It is something we do” (Noë
2004: 1). Action and perception are two sides of the same coin, they are the means of our
exploratory dynamic engagement with the environment. If cognition is the kind of thing
that can be localized anywhere, according to Chicago pragmatists it cannot be situated
exclusively in our heads (cf. Mead 1934/1967: 112). In the same manner as Dewey and
Mead in the past, Clark currently maintains that “the actual local operations that realize
certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feedforward,
and feed-around loops:  loops that  promiscuously  criss-cross  the boundaries  of  brain,
body, and world. The local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head.
Cognition leaks out into body and world” (Clark 2008: xxviii).
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Cognition and Action Overlapped – The Pragmatic
Significance of Attitudes
8 In his theory of the act, Mead’s main concern is to provide a fully naturalistic explanation
of cognition that revolves around these fundamental principles. In contrast to classical
Watsonian7 behaviorism Mead’s  social  behaviorism holds  that  it  is  not  necessary  to
explain away consciousness altogether as long as we do not treat it in Cartesian terms as
an inner experiential space accessible solely from the first-person perspective:
Watson apparently assumes that to deny the existence of mind or consciousness as
a psychical stuff, substance, or entity is to deny its existence altogether, and that a
naturalistic or behavioristic account of it as such is out of the question. But, on the
contrary,  we  may  deny  its  existence  as  a  psychical  entity  without  denying  its
existence in some other sense at all; and if we then conceive it functionally, and as a
natural rather than a transcendental phenomenon, it becomes possible to deal with
it in behavioristic terms. In short, it is not possible to deny the existence of mind or
consciousness or mental phenomena, nor is it desirable to do so. (Mead 1934/1967:
10)
9 Mead, thus, does not see a problem in postulating an inner domain of experience as long
as we ascribe it only with proper functional, but not ontological, status. What proper
functional status means, in this regard, is that in order to explain action we can postulate
existence of neural events in the central nervous system which sensitize the perceiving
organism to certain kind of perceptual stimuli and enable it to act toward them. Mead
calls these neural paths attitudes, and defines them as non-propositional and sub-personal
beginnings of acts in terms of specific readiness of an organism to perform all sorts of
responses towards perceptual objects. They are inner, however, “not in the sense of being
in another world, a subjective world, but in the sense of being within the organism”
(Mead 1934/1967:  5).  Attitudes are an integral  part  of  the act  although they are not
subject to direct observation: “The external act that we observe is a part of the process
which has started from within” (Mead 1934/1967: 5). A skeptic might ask whether this
sort  of  treatment does not  commit  us,  again,  to exactly the same kind of  mind-first
explanation against which pragmatism argues. As serious a concern as it may seem at
first glance, if we recall Dewey’s 1896 article it becomes clear that attitudes are not in any
way to be equated with reflective mental states. Attitudes come into existence in higher-
order organisms endowed with central nervous systems. On the basis of the organism’s
active behavior and problem solving, attitudes come into existence as neural pathways
encoding  bodily  habits  which  are  responding  to  certain  kinds  of  environmental
stimulation. For Mead, the very concept or idea of an object is to be equated with “such
an  organization  of  a  great  group  of  nervous  elements  as  will  lead  to  conduct  with
reference to the objects about us” (Mead 1934/1967: 70-71).8
10 In his treatment of attitudes, Mead strictly preserves the conceptual and methodological
pattern laid out by Dewey in The Reflex Arc Concept.  Following Dewey, Mead takes the
relation between stages of the act as being not primarily causal but rather functional.
Functionality, for that matter, presupposes purposiveness. In words of W. Teed Rockwell:
“For Dewey […] all experience is constituted by its relationship to the world and the goals
of  the  experiencer”  (Rockwell  2005:  88).  In  Mead’s  theory  of  the  act,  this  strand of
thought is  elaborated in his  notion of  natural  teleology of  attitudes.  In other words,
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attitudes play a pivotal  role within the act  as purposive,  goal-directed elements that
control certain course of action from the beginning until the very end.
11 Mead’s concept of teleology of attitudes built upon Dewey’s model of organic action is
currently gaining in credibility due to the recent extensive research into mirror neurons.9
These neurons were accidentally discovered by a group of Italian neuroscientists led by
Giacomo Rizzolatti during their research into the ventral premotor cortex in primates
which is responsible for grasping and manipulating objects. Rizzolatti’s group noticed
that certain groups of neurons fired not only when a primate was executing a certain
motor action but,  surprisingly,  also when one primate was merely watching another
primate (including humans) doing the same thing.10 What is important for our discussion
here is  that  mirror neurons are not  a  new kind of  neurons.  What Rizzolatti  and his
colleagues have found, to their own surprise, is that the mirror function is played by the
neurons responsible for sensorimotor operations. Referring explicitly to Mead, Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia claim that:
‘We look because we handle, and we are able to handle because we look’, are the
words  used  almost  a  century  ago  by  George  Herbert  Mead  to  emphasize  how
perception would not be possible ‘without a continued control of such an organ as
that of vision by such an organ as that of the hand, and vice versa’ [Mead 1907: 388].
Without this mutual control we would not be able to pick up our cup of coffee.
However the analysis of the visuo-motor transformations operated by the AIP-FS
neurons indicates that the seeing which guides the hand is  also (and above all)
seeing with the hand, by which the object is immediately coded as a given set of
invitations to act. (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008: 50)
12 The relevance of the pragmatic concept of action represented by Dewey and Mead for
contemporary cognitive neuroscience cannot be clearer. The findings of Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia confirm on empirical grounds not only the very intimate connection between
perception and action, but also the goal-directed nature of action in certain higher-order
organisms.11 Moreover,  findings in mirror neuron research also seem to indicate the
existence of attitudes. Analogically to Mead’s example of grasping a hammer, Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia provide their own example with grasping a cup of coffee:
[w]e will grasp it in different ways depending on whether we are picking it up to
drink from it, to rinse it, or simply to move it from one place to another. Moreover,
our grip on the cup varies according to the circumstances, whether we are afraid of
burning  our  fingers,  or  the  cup  is  surrounded  by  other  objects;  it  will  also  be
influenced by our customs, habits, and our inclination to adhere to certain social
rules and so on. (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008: 36-37)
13 The present conclusions seem to indicate that Dewey and Mead were right in maintaining
that  the  simple  stimulus-response  model  of  action  that  is  still  being  advocated  (in
however refined a formulation), is simply inaccurate as a paradigm for explaining the
nature  of  action in  higher-order  organisms.  The one-dimensional  model  of  having a
perceptual stimulus of a cup of coffee → reaching for it → grasping it, etc., is incorrect
because  in  the  course  of  action all  these  elements  work  in  parallel,  the  arm moves
towards the cup and contemporaneously the hand already assumes the shape necessary
for grasping it. If we now recall that, in Mead’s view, the concept of object is to be defined
in terms of an organization of neural paths that will lead us to certain kinds of conduct
with reference to certain perceptual stimuli, we can see why he calls distant perceptual
objects as “invitations to conduct” (Mead 1938: 280). In Mead’s words: “Man lives in the
world of Meaning. What he sees and hears means what he will or might handle” (Mead
1926/1964: 294).
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14 Cognizing organisms are thus not to be understood as disembodied computing engines,
but  rather  as  cognitive  agents,  situated  in  environments  where  they  pursue  their
practical  goals  on  the  basis  of  what  James  J.  Gibson called  affordances.  According  to
Gibson: “affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or
furnishes, either  for  good or  ill  […]  I  mean by it  something that  refers  to  both the
environment  and  the  animal  in  a  way  that  no  existing  term  does.  It  implies  the
complementarity of the animal and the environment” (Gibson 1979: 127). In this respect,
comparative  psychologist  Louise  Barrett  makes  an  insightful  point:  “Affordances  are
‘organism-dependent’  […] because they reflect  the degree to which an animal with a
particular  kind  of  nervous  system  can  detect  and  make  use  of  particular  kinds  of
environmental opportunities” (Barrett 2011: 98). Similarly, Mark Johnson remarks that
the whole process of perceiving affordances and subsequent concept formation “is loosely
goal-directed and has always a built-in teleological aspect, since organisms have implicit
values they are trying to realize […], protecting themselves from harm, reproducing, and,




15 From the point of view of the argument I am endorsing here, Mead’s crucial concept of
attitudes  elaborated  in  light  of  Dewey’s  abovementioned  1896  article  enables  us  to
redefine the notion of representation on pragmatic grounds. As we have seen, attitudes
are outcomes of adaptive strategies of higher-order organisms. These attitudes take the
form of neural pathways12 enabling them to accurately respond to certain perceptual
stimuli  in  the  course  of  their  goal-directed action.  Attitudes,  therefore,  are  adaptive
neural  elements  that  provide  for  effective  coupling  between  an  organism  and  its
environment. They enable the organism to trigger adequate habitual responses in the
presence of the stimuli that may lead them to fulfillment of their pragmatic goals. From
the pragmatic point of view, the radical situatedness of the organism in its environment
results in the need for creating certain strategies that enable the organism to develop
close and cost-effective ways of coupling with it.
16 Attitudes,  manifesting themselves  in the human action in the form of  habits13 are,  I
maintain, examples of exactly this kind strategy. Such a notion of the nature of attitudes
(habits) has, in my view, extremely important ramifications for the classical notion of
representation. If, on the one hand, there is no ontological gap between an organism and
the environment and,  on the other,  attitudes and habits are formed as the cognitive
agent’s  action-maps  of  the  environment  itself,  then  we  no  longer  have  to  think  of
representations in terms of creating models of the external reality. Rather, we should
understand them as models of interaction with it. Cognitive agents, thus, do not have to
create rich inner models of the world, instead they can “use the world as its own model”
(Brooks  1991:  1).  Such  a  view  of  representation  as  creating  models  of  interaction
resonates also with Charles S. Peirce’s words: “we have direct experience of things in
themselves. Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our
own ideas” (CP 6.95). According to the pragmatists, mind and nature are ultimately the
same  thing,  which  means  that  in  the  process  of  cognition  the  mind  engages  the
environmental  structures  and  reaches  out  into  the  world:  “We  can  approach  the
noumenal  nature  of  reality  only  through  the  noumenal  nature  of  thought  […]  the
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experience in which human beings are involved, is the constituent part of reality which
they judge” (Mead 1929/1964: 339). In a similar vein, Rockwell points out that “there is no
need to make a copy of the world inside the head in order for us to be aware of our
environment  if  our  consciousness  is  partly  embodied  by  the  environment  itself”
(Rockwell  2005:  86).  If  cognition  functions  within  the  brain-body-world  nexus,  the
problem of how our quasi-inner-representations match up with the world does not even
come up.
17 I propose, following the distinction introduced by Mark Rowlands, that the kind of human
action that executes attitudes and habits in our practical engagements with the world
could also be called – deeds (cf. Rowlands 2006: 95). According to Rowlands, deeds occupy
the logical space between what he calls actions (which are intentional courses of action
perceived  and  carried  out  on  the  personal  level  of  consciousness)  and  doings  (non-
intentional  movements,  of  which  we  are  not  aware  and  which  serve  no  purpose
connected with action).14 From the pragmatic point of view, deeds could be defined as
individual instances of habits. To use Rowlands’ example, deeds include such things as the
positioning of fingers in catching a ball that is flying toward us, or the movement of our
fingers while playing the piano. They work at sub-personal level of consciousness and as
models of interaction with the environmental structures they attune us to the world.
Deeds are pre intentional acts – we usually do not think about them in the execution of
our everyday tasks, and yet, as expressions of attitudes and habits they effectively map
appropriate worldly structures and enable us to achieve our pragmatic goals. We employ
them in accurate positioning of our legs when walking the stairs,  spontaneous motor
operations when driving a car etc.  With Michael Wheeler,  we can call  deeds “action-
oriented representations” (Wheeler 2005: 197). Deeds re-present the existing world not as
an internal image but as a virtual space of action. What is represented by means of deeds
is not knowledge that the environment is so and so, but knowledge of how to negotiate the
environment. In the action-oriented approach, says Wheeler, “how the world is is itself
encoded in terms of possibilities for action” (Wheeler 2005: 197, original italics). According
to pragmatists, mind and nature are, ultimately, the same thing, which means that in the
process of cognition the mind engages the environmental structures and reaches out into
the  world.  To  paraphrase  James’  example,  deeds  represent  the  appropriate  worldly
structures in a similar way as the shape of a key matches with a particular lock. Neither
the lock, nor the key, can by themselves open the door; they can do it only in conjunction
with one another. Following Dewey, representation is, thus, not primarily a noun. Rather,
we should understand it first and foremost as a verb. By means of deeds we off-load our
cognitive burden partly onto the permanent bodily and environmental  structures on
which we can rely and achieve our practical goals (cf. Noë 2009: 97-104).15
18 As Rowlands also shows,  the concept  of deeds  is  able  to  satisfy  the analytic  criteria
commonly regarded as sufficient for an item to qualify as representational. There are, it is
generally accepted, five such criteria (for a more detailed account cf. Rowlands 2006: 114):
1. Informational condition16 – an item r qualifies as a representational item only if it carries
information about some state of affairs s that is extrinsic to it.
2. Teleological condition – an item r qualifies as representational only if it has the proper
function either of tracking the feature or state of affairs s that produces it, or of enabling an
organism to achieve some goal in virtue of tracking s.
3. Decouplability condition – item r qualifies as representing state of affairs s only if r is, in an
appropriate sense, decouplable from s.
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4. Misrepresentation condition – item r qualifies as representing state of affairs s only if it is
capable of misrepresenting s.
5. Combinatorial condition – for an item r to qualify as representational, it must occur not in
isolation but only as part of a more general representational framework.
19 From the pragmatist perspective, if the concept of representation has any content at all,
it  is  precisely  the  above-mentioned  one.  If  we  should  illustrate  what  such  a
representation  through  action  looks  like  in  practice,  let  us  imagine  the  following
scenario. I enter a dark room, and in order to be able to see I hit the switch of the lights. If
the lights go on, then we can determine whether the deed of hitting the switch counts as
representational of certain features of my environment on the basis of the above-listed
conditions. The deed of hitting the switch counts as representational because, under the
informational condition it, e.g. tracks the location, shape and size of the switch. The deed is
teleological because it has the proper function of achieving a practical goal in virtue of
tracking the environmental state of affairs s. The deed is also decouplable from the state of
affairs it  tracks because I  can later remember and demonstrate how I  hit  the switch
replicating the same act. Obviously, in the process of representation through action, I can
also misrepresent my environment in many ways. Eventually, the deed in question can be
combined into a more general representational structure (by means of hitting the switch I
try to pursue some further goals – finding a book etc.). It could, therefore, be maintained
that attitudes and habits, in the form of deeds represent the appropriate environmental
structures if  we can achieve particular goals by means of  enacting the habits  in our
action; simply put – deeds represent if we can get things done using them. Successful
employment of deeds in the world means that they are correct representations of the
appropriate environmental structures since they stand the test of practical action. This is
not to say that they represent the world in terms of accurate copying it, but rather in
terms of accurate coping with it.17
20 An obvious argument against such a view would be, whether we, in fact, need such a
notion of representation. Would it not be better, after all,  to get rid of the notion of
representation altogether, since its definition given above strays much too far from what
we  usually  take  representation  to  mean?  In  my  opinion,  it  would  not.  Successfully
employed habits and attitudes tell us something important about the world – they inform
us that we can rely on it and, thus, make it available to us. They enable us to be at home
in the world by making it transparent, in other words – they re-present it.18 It should be
noted, however, that such a process representation through action unfolds on a non-
propositional, non-intentional, and sub-personal level of consciousness and should not be
understood as a process of matching “inner pictures” in our heads (mental content) with
the world “out there.” Representation, in the pragmatist rendition, is thoughtless. That is
to say, it is a bodily process of enacting the world by means of our habits (deeds) and, for
most of the time, does not need to be mediated by mental content.
21 Since our minds are a genuine part of nature, they do not have to copy the world in its
entirety. In fact, they are not even able to do so. As Noë convincingly shows, our memory
is rather weak in storing detailed information about the surrounding environment (cf.
e.g. Noë 2004; 2012). This fact, however, makes very good sense from the evolutionary
point of view. It would be energetically as well as computationally extremely costly (and
consequently  disadvantageous)  for  any  organism  to  create  and  store  inner
representations of environmental structures.  An organism with this kind of cognitive
strategy would be at  a  great  disadvantage in comparison to an organism which had
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merely developed effective strategies for detecting necessary environmental information
when needed. In this respect, Clark writes: “In general, evolved creatures will neither
store nor process information in costly ways when they can use the structure of the
environment and their operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-
processing operations concerned. That is, know only as much as you need to know to get
the job done” (Clark 1997a: 46). If this heuristic picture, vividly dubbed by Clark the “007
Principle,” is correct, i.e., if it is true that cognition has evolved in order to work in such
close conjunction with environmental structures appropriate for reaching the cognitive
agent’s goals, then cognition is realized not only by internal neural mechanisms but also
by the world itself.  In this  regard,  Mead remarks:  “[c]onsciousness is  functional,  not
substantive;  and in either  of  the main senses  of  the term it  must  be  located in the
objective world rather than in the brain” (Mead 1934/1967: 112). By the same token, if
organisms enact certain environmental structures in the course of their problem-solving
activities, these structures become in a way their cognitive architecture. In other words,
we can reasonably say that organisms are not passive recipients of the environmental
pressures  but  on  the  contrary,  they  are  active  “managers”  (or  “engineers”)  in
constructing their cognitive niches, which can be, following Clark, defined as an outcome of
“the process by which animals build physical structures that transform problem spaces in
ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain
or  domains”  (Clark  2008:  62).19 Cognitive  niches,  then,  are used  by  organisms  as
environmental structures for off-loading some of the practical and cognitive burdens of
their  actions  directly  onto the world.  However,  as  Rowlands  points  out,  “division of
epistemic  burden  requires  division  of  epistemic  credit”  (Rowlands  2003:  179).
Representation, we can therefore contend, does not take place exclusively in our heads,
as classical epistemologists would hold, but, at least in part, also in the world itself by
being enacted in our action.
 
Mind and Body Extended – Mead’s Theory of the Act
22 The concept of cognition and representation as processes taking place, at least partly, in
the  world  makes  an  important  case  for  a  pragmatic  defense  of  realism.  Too  often
pragmatism  has  been  accused  of  being  a  subjectivist  philosophy  which  denies  the
existence of objective facts independent of our mind. In light of what we have considered
so far,  ho wever,  it  becomes clear  that  the pragmatist  theory of  knowledge actually
opposes such views. An illustrative example of this is Mead’s theory of the act. In the
remainder of this paper, I would, therefore, like to analyze how the above-mentioned
conceptual foundations are embodied in his pragmatic theory of cognition and action.
23 In  Mead’s  metaphysics,  an act  is  to  be  understood as  a  fundamental  unit  of  human
experience (e.g. Mead 1938: 66). In fact, “wherever we find living forms, we find acts”
(Mead 1927/1982: 108). Acts are, either reflective or unreflective, ways of being in the
world of all living forms. In the life process, acts set up a space of the dialectics of means
and ends in which living forms maintain and replicate themselves. Mead was convinced
that the life processes in nature manifest what Clark calls adaptive coupling, which “occurs
when a system (typically a plant or animal) evolves a mechanism that allows it to track
the behavior of another system (a predator, or a source of food or energy)” (Clark 1999:
347). As Cornelis de Waal remarks, we can trace the processes of adaptive coupling from
events as relatively simple as the sunflower turning towards the sun, up to very complex
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human behavior such as browsing the Internet (cf. Waal 2002: 19). What these, indeed
very diverse, processes have in common, though, is their teleological nature – they are
aimed (although mostly unreflectively) at achieving goals in the life-process: “All acts, as
such, are teleological. They move towards a result which is a success or a failure” (Mead
n.d./2011: 21).20 Goal-directed behavior (teleology of the act) is, thus, according to Mead
the  basic  characteristic  of  all  living  forms  (e.g.  Mead 1938:  640).  Mead would,  thus,
undeniably agree with contemporary findings of the philosopher of cognitive science,
Radu  J.  Bogdan,  who  holds  that  goal-directedness  should  be  viewed  not  only  as  a
successful  life-strategy,  but  in  fact  as  one  of  the  very  conditions  for  survival  and
replication of all living forms (cf. Bogdan 1994: 19).21
24 As  indicated  above,  Mead’s  theory  of  the  act  unfolds  within  the  conceptual  scheme
delineated by the stage of impulse on the one end, and that of consummation on the
other.  Each  act  begins  at  the  stage  of  an  impulse  which  is  defined  by  Mead  as  “a
congenital tendency to respond in a specific manner to a certain sort of stimulus, under
certain  organic  conditions”  (Mead  1934/1967:  337).  By  contrast,  an  act  finds  its
completion in consummation which can be characterized as a successful  finishing or
satisfaction of the particular course of action (cf. Mead 1938: 36). As indicated above, the
impulse already contains, in itself, its goal (end-in-view) that would, thus, under ideal
environmental conditions, lead the organism directly to the stage of consummation. In
the case of higher-order organisms, however, this situation almost never takes place. This
is  why Mead introduces into his  analysis  of  action two mediatory phases of  the act,
namely – perception and manipulation. The very occurrence of an impulse, Mead holds,
indicates increasing lack of adjustment between an organism and its environment that
urges the organism to employ a series of adaptive strategies (change of spatial position,
movement, active searching for stimuli, etc.) that help it successfully achieve its goals.
The  lack  of  adjustment  between  an  organism  and  its  environment  is  therefore
surmounted by means of mediatory phases of the act. The teleological character of the
impulse sensitizes the organism to certain kinds of stimuli:
The  process  of  sensing  is  itself  an  activity.  In  the  case  of  vision  this  is  most
evidently the case. Here the movement of the eyes, the focusing of the lens, and the
adjustment of  the lines of  vision of  the two eyes require a complicated activity
which is further complicated by the movements of the eyes which will bring the
rays of light coming from all parts of the object upon the center of clearest vision.
(Mead 1938: 3-4)
25 In the phase of perception the organism, with reference to its goals, actively brings into
focus the appropriate characteristics of the environment. Arguing against Russell, Mead
holds  that  perception (with vision being its  paradigmatic  example)  is  nothing like  a
camera which only passively receives “the data” from its environment (cf. Mead 1938:
133).  There  is  nothing like  the  given,  which is  to  say  that  the  content  of  perceptual
experience is not only goal-relative but also deeply movement-dependent: “The sensing
of the object as so located that the organism takes a definite attitude toward it, involving
possible movement toward or away from the object,  is  thus a part  of  the process of
perception” (Mead 1938: 4). Nowadays, almost exactly the same point is made by Noë
when he says:  “The basis  of  perception,  on our enactive,  sensori-motor  approach,  is
implicit practical knowledge of the ways movement gives rise to stimulation” (Noë 2004:
8).  In other words,  in the process of  perception the organism has to  perform certain
practical strategies if it wants to bring the perceptual object into an appropriate focus.
The very phase of perception bears with it, therefore, an important normative dimension.
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In the process of perception, the organism understands (however unreflectively) what it
is supposed to do, if it wants to reach a distant object in a particular way.22 At that point,
however, we can see that the traditional line between perception and thinking could be
put into question. It might no longer be true that thinking is an entirely inner activity
based on the computational processes occurring inside our skulls.  By contrast,  in the
pragmatic view, it is the implicit practical understanding of changes in the perceptual
field on the basis of bodily movement that could possibly be regarded as the origin of
thinking. It should also be noted that in this enactive paradigm it is the world itself on
which  the  animal  relies.  The  organism  does  not  have  to  create  some  inner
representations of the worldly structures if it is sufficient for it just to create appropriate
ways of interaction with them in terms of bodily movements.23
26 At the stage of perception, Mead distinguished between what he called contact and distant
experience: “The human animal is sensitive with five channels for experience; but all of
these  reduce  to  distance  experience  and contact  experience”  (Mead 1927/1982:  107).
Contact  experience  is  the  immediate  presence  of  the  environment  as  it  appears  in
unmediated  physical  opposition.  By  contrast,  distance  experience  is  the  kind  of
experience we have of objects which are not within our reach. In opposition to the vast
majority of  the epistemological  tradition,  for Mead contact experience is  more basic:
“Reality  reduces  to  possible  future  experiences”  (Mead  1927/1982:  118).  As  de  Waal
eloquently puts it:  “True to his pragmatism, Mead maintained that the meaning of a
distance experience is the future contact experiences it represents” (Waal 2002: 21-22).
Again, we arrive here at the notion of affordance – according to Mead a distant object in
our experience is completely laid out in terms of possible actions we can carry out toward
it: “The object in perception is a distant object. It invites us to action with reference to it,
and  that  action  leads  to  results  which  generally  accomplish  the  act  as  a  biological
undertaking” (Mead 1938: 12).24 In Mead’s view, the objects invite us to get into tactile
contact with them, to manipulate and transform them, which is why Miller has called him
a “haptic philosopher” (Miller in Mead 1982: 12). Alva Noë has recently made a similar
point when he states that all  perception is touch-like (cf.  Noë 2004: 1).  For Mead the
ultimate test of experience lies in haptic contact, within which the validity of distant
perceptual experience is examined.25 Perception, involving movement towards a distant
object, and leading ultimately to the consummatory stage of the act, applies, in Mead’s
view, to all animals.
27 With humans, however, Mead distinguishes another functional stage of action, namely
the  stage  of  manipulation.  In  the  case  human  beings,  the  distance  experience  is
connected to the contact experience by means of eye-hand coordination. The phase of
manipulation, therefore, intervenes between perception of distant objects and successful
completion of the act at the stage of consummation. For Mead, the role of the hand in the
development of human intelligence is of crucial importance. Manipulation can be defined
as human activity of transformation and exploitation of the environmental structures in
order to achieve particular goals of action. The human animal, as Mead would call our
species, does not proceed from the stage of perception directly to consummation but due
to the high development of the hand, with its opposition of the thumb, is capable of
delaying her response to environmental stimuli: “the process of exercising intelligence is
the process of delaying, organizing and selecting a response or reaction to the stimuli of
the  given  environmental  situation”  (Mead  1934/1967:  100).  The  existence  and
physiological structure of the hand enables human beings26 not to devour the desired
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object immediately but manipulate, reorganize or transform it in order to achieve further
goals. In the opinion of Cornelis de Waal, the hand is, for Mead, in “many respects even
more characteristic of human intelligence than the brain” (Waal 2002: 26). Humans are
tool-using beings that use “implements that can extend the length or power of the hand”
(Mead 1927/1982: 119). Mead suggests that by means of tools we can enlarge our body-
schema  and  use  those  tools  as  an  actual  extension  of  our  limbs.  As  Rizzolatti  and
Sinigaglia have noted, the validity of this startling insight of Mead’s has been recently
confirmed by research conducted under the lead of Atsushi Iriki. What Iriki’s team has,
famously, found during their research of monkeys’ brains is that those individuals that
had  been  trained  to  use  a  rake  when  reaching  for  food  exhibited  enlarged  cortical
representations of the hand and arm. More specifically, the brain cells that are sensitive
to both the look and the feel of the hand and arm treated the rake extension of the arm as
if it were part of the body, that is – as if it were the arm itself (cf. Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia
2008: 74-75). That is to say, the rake outright entered the monkey’s body-schema and
became temporarily a part of its body27.27 From the philosophical point of view, these
findings  suggest  that  the plasticity  (especially)  of  human brains  enables  us,  as  Clark
maintains:
To enter into deep and complex relationships with nonbiological constructs, props
and aids […] it is our special character, as human beings, to be forever driven to
create,  co-opt,  annex and exploit  nonbiological  props and scaffoldings  We have
been  designed  by  mother  nature,  to  exploit  deep  neural  plasticity  in  order  to
become one with our best and most reliable tools. (Clark 2003: 5)
28 By means of tool-usage, human beings actively manage their body-schema. Consequently,
they also transform their peripersonal space, i. e. the space within our reach.28 What was
merely present (distance experience) suddenly becomes available. “Where do we stop and
where does the rest of the world begin?,” asks Noë (2009: 80). In his opinion, there is no
principled reason to think our bodies stop where we think they do. Similarly, Dewey once
wrote:  “The epidermis is  only in the most superficial  way an indication of  where an
organism ends and its environment begins” (LW 10: 64). The Chicago pragmatists, as well
as the defenders of the extended mind theory, contend that technology increases our
access to the world, which is to say that it increases the extent of what is, or at least can
be,  available  for  us.  Our  worlds  are,  therefore,  not  confined  to  what  is  memorized,
perceived or “represented” inside our heads. We are creatures that, due to our mastery of
technology, extend our minds29 and bodies outside our skinbags.
 
Conclusion
29 In the pragmatic view, we can therefore conclude, cognition is a way of close coupling
between an organism and its environment. It is not something that happens exclusively
in our heads. The world itself is immediately given to us due to our practical strategies of
active engagement with the environmental structures. Thus, unlike classical empiricists,
pragmatists maintain that the world does not come to us for free, it only shows up if we
actively develop practical strategies of hooking up with it. In the version of pragmatism
Dewey and Mead advocated,  these practical  strategies are encoded in our brains and
bodies via attitudes and habits which attune us to particular worldly structures. Habits
(executed in the form of so called deeds), then, as I was trying to argue, can be described
as representations of these worldly structures if, by enacting them in our actions, we can
accomplish our practical tasks. Successful employment of deeds in the world means that
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they are correct representations of the worldly structures they refer to since they stand
the test of practical action. From this perspective it seems that pragmatism does not
necessarily have to get rid of the notion of representation altogether. What it ought to do,
on the other hand, is to reformulate it in terms of action. Representations, then, will
cease to be defined in terms of pictures magically matching the outer world but will be
situated where cognition unfolds, that is, in the world itself. If we adopt such a view, it is
clear that, from the pragmatic perspective, we represent the world not so much in our
heads but, much rather, through our bodies and embodied action in it.
30 The main contention of contemporary advocates of the extended mind theory saying that
cognition is something which unfolds in the world (at least as much as in our heads) is not
a new one. As I was trying to argue in this paper, Mead and Dewey held this position a
century ago. However, this is not to mean that pragmatists cannot learn anything from
the extended mind theory.  Quite  the  contrary.  Since  pragmatism has  always  been a
philosophical school aiming at conceptual clarity and “empirical responsibility” (Lakoff &
Johnson  1999:  xi),  it  is  through  the  prism  of  the  extended  mind  theory  that  we  –
pragmatists – can learn how to read our own classics in new and inspiring ways. Peirce
once wrote: “modern philosophy has never been able quite to shake off the Cartesian idea
of  the  mind,  as  something  that  ’resides’  –  such  is  the  term  –  in  the  pineal  gland.
Everybody laughs at this nowadays, and yet everybody continues to think of mind in this
same  general  way,  as  something  within  this person  or  that,  belonging  to  him  and
correlative to the real world. A whole course of lectures would be required to expose this
error” (CP 5.128). Today, we can see that Peirce was extremely optimistic about how long
it  would  take  to  finally  overcome  Cartesianism.  Even  after  decades  of  consistent
opposition against it, the Cartesian picture of mind still holds captive a good portion of
the contemporary philosophy of mind (mostly through various forms of internalism).
That is why a firm alliance between pragmatism and the extended mind theory should be
urgently pursued.
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NOTES
1. Although we are able to offer no historical evidence, Mead’s profound interpreter and, at the 
same time, one of his best students – David L. Miller holds that this article of Dewey’s must have
been an outcome of mutual intellectual interchange between Dewey and Mead at the start of thei
r careers first in Ann Arbor and later in Chicago in 1890s (cf. Miller 1973: 32). Whether this is real
ly the case is probably going to remain an open question. How- ever, as Joas shows, even Mead’s c
rucial early paper The Definition of the Psychical (1903) should be appreciated as a considerable ref
inement of the ideas, presented in Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc concept (cf. Joas 1985: 69-89
).
2. As James Campbell pointed out, Dewey’s publication of this essay in Psychological Review shou
ld be viewed from the broader context of Dewey’s critical reception of the movement of so-called 
the ‘New Psychology.’ Cf. also Campbell (1995: 31-38).
3. Cf. also Clark (1997a: 163; 1997b: 476).
4. “…biological concepts are not merely causal but functional as well. Functions presuppose purp
oses and goals. Dewey portrays experience as fundamentally purposive in opposition to the positi
on that Dewey calls sensationalistic empiricism, which sees experience as discrete sense data that
are intrinsically irrelevant to the goals of the perceiver. For Dewey there is no such thing as a r
aw feel; all experience is constituted by its relationship to the world and the goals of the experien
cer” (Rockwell 2005: 88).
5. According to Kilpinen, by reversing the heuristic focus from what he calls “mind-first-explana
tion of action” (characteristic of both the phenomenological as well as the analytic tradition) to e
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xplanation of how organic habits are established the philosophy of pragmatism brought about th
e “Copernican revolution in conceptualization of action.” Cf. Kilpinen (2008).
6. At present, this position is defended by thinkers like Alva Noë or Evan Thompson under the lab
el of ‘enac- tivism,’ or ‘actionism’ (cf. Noë 2012), of which the pragmatist philosophers are early p
redecessors. Cf. esp. Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), Varela, et al. (1991).
7. Mead regarded Watsonian behaviorism as an incorrect theory that can be refuted on empirical
grounds. Cf. Joas (1985: 113).
8. Mark Johnson, referring to the work of an Italian neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese arrives at a ve
ry similar notion when he writes that a concept of an object is: “a model of structures of recurrin
g organism-environment coupling, and it is a model for possible perceptions and actions that one
might experience” (Johnson 2007: 159).
9. Mirror neurons are neurons that fire both when an animal acts and when the animal observes 
the same action performed by another. Thus, the neurons mirror the behavior of the other, as th
ough the observer were itself acting. Such neurons have been directly observed in primate and o
ther species including birds. In humans, brain activity consistent with that of mirror neurons has
been found in the premotor cortex, the supplementary motor area, the primary somatosensory c
ortex and the inferior parietal cortex (cf. Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008; Iacoboni 2008).
10. The discovery of mirror neurons also has profound implications for contemporary assessmen
t of Mead’s views on social cognition as the recent research seems to suggest that there is an imit
ation taking place at a fundamental level of social conduct (e.g. Iacoboni 2008). If this is really the
case, some authors conclude that Mead’s views on the nature of imitation and origins of selfhood 
(as included for instance in Mead (1934/1967: 51-61)) are essentially mistaken (cf. Turner 2007, fo
r a reaction to his views, for instance, Lizardo 2007). While I do think that the discovery of mirror
neurons implies a need to redefine the pragmatic treatment of imitation, I disagree with Turner i
n his view that just because there are some imitative processes involved in human social cognitio
n, we should altogether discard the idea that the self is the product of social interaction. The imit
ation taking place due to mirror neurons is taking place at sub-personal, pre-reflective level of co
nsciousness and thus cannot, by itself, un- dermine the classical notion of the self as a product of 
reflective social interaction with which Mead was con- cerned the most. In the present article, ho
wever, I will have to leave these questions aside as my primary goal here (which is the analysis of
the pragmatic views on the nature of cognitive processes as such) and the space limita tions do n
ot allow me to deal with these questions in the depth they undoubtedly deserve. For a detailed tr
eatment of this topic see Madzia (forthcoming).
11. In this regard, Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia talk about the subset of mirror neurons which they have
called “canonical neurons” (cf. Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008: 79-80). Canonical neurons reflect a
ffordances, they fire when an animal perceives an object that affords certain kind of action.
12. Johnson describes them in terms of activation patterns and synaptic weights (cf. Johnson 20
07: 157-160).
13. 13 In this article, I propose to interpret habits as embodied manifestations or performances o
f attitudes. Although Mead himself does not make such a distinction, it certainly does not contra
dict his theory. Cf. Mead (1934/1967: 8–13, 125–134), Quéré (2011: 153–154).
14. Cf. Rowlands (2006: 93-111).
15. With a little bit of exaggeration we can say that without habits we would not be able to make i
t through the day. If we would be forced, on a daily basis, to figure out the most basic traits of our
everyday lives over and over again, our intellectual capacities would soon surely break down.
16. A pragmatic account of representation through action might probably do just fine without th
e informational condition altogether. The reason for this is primarily because it is not very clear 
what the term “information” means in this particular context. As Hutto and Myin argue, a truly n
aturalistic picture of cognition should abandon the idea that cognition is primarily contentful an
d intentional. In this respect, cognition should not be taken primarily as “informational content 
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processing” but rather as a process of adjustment of a living organism to its environment. In that
respect, Hutto and Myin propose that the notion of information could (and should) be replaced b
y covariance (cf. esp. Hutto & Myin 2013: 63-71). Indeed, Hutto and Myin’s concept of covariance i
s, from the pragmatist perspective, much better suited for the talk of cognition than “informatio
n.”
17. It also makes a very good sense to say that if we want to effectively cope with the world, our a
ctions should be led by rules of some specific kind. Within the realm of the extended mind theory
, however, the norma- tive dimension of embodied action is still quite an underdeveloped project
. A promising outline of how the extended mind theory might proceed along these lines was prop
osed, for instance, by Menary (2007).
18. Representations defined in terms of deeds are, in this sense, also universal. Deeds embody ha
bits, and one habit can be used to respond to multiple particular environmental situations (say, 
the skill to hit the switch of the light – by the same habit we can switch lights on in many places).
Miller calls them “open” because, he says, “we do not know in advance the detailed character of 
particulars to which they may apply” (Miller 1973: 99). Since deeds are instances of habits, they, i
n a sense, transcend environmental particulars to which they respond, they are action-universal
s.
19. In Mead, we can find reference to something that might be called cognitive niche as well: “A s
ocial organism – that is, a social group of individual organisms – constitutes or creates its own sp
ecial environment of objects just as, and in the same sense as, an individual organism constitutes 
or creates its own special environment of objects (which, however, is much more rudimentary th
an the environment constructed by a social organism)” (Mead 1934/1967: 130).
20. For a similar point, cf. Mead (1910/1964: 105-06).
21. According to Bogdan, the teleological adaptation could be almost identified with life itself (B
ogdan 1994: 28-38).
22. This characteristic of animal perception is clearly visible for instance during their hunting
for prey.
23. In  Mead,  we  can  see  exactly  this  point  in  his  explanation  of  the  paradox  of  duality  of
perceptual content. Cf. Mead (1938: 240-51).
24. In the same manner Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia call perceptual objects “action proposals.” Cf.
Rizzolatti &Sinigaglia (2008: 35).
25. In this respect, Mead interestingly comes close to ancient Stoics who, in their discussion with 
the skepticism of the middle Academia (Arcesilaus), introduced the notion of the graspable prese
ntation (katalēptikē phantasia). Cf. Hankinson (2003: 271-73).
26. Mead was aware of the fact that similar situation applies for instance to apes as well. Cf. Mead
(1938: 136-37).
27. Cf. also Noë (2009: 79-80).
28. As opposed to the so called ‘extrapersonal space,’ that is, the space out of our immediate reac
h.
29. Would it not, however, suffice to say that our use of those tools is merely instrumental and th
at all the “real” cognitive processing takes place solely inside our heads? This criticism is undeni
ably a legitimate one and the discussion over it is still in progress – so far, with no clear winners. 
However, as Clark (1997a, 2003, 2008) illustrates through a vast number of practical examples, th
e evidence that practical action on certain environmental structures and tools in some cases reall
y constitutes cognitive processing is overwhelming. The cognitive architec- ture that humans are
inclined to construct seems not only to complement and enhance our ‘inner’ cognitive processin
g but also, if it were to be removed, then some of our cognitive competences would be either dimi
nished to the minimum or would even never develop (Krueger 2011: 646). For the criticism of the
views presented by Clark, cf. Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2007/2010), Rupert (2009).
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ABSTRACTS
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  it  examines  the  pragmatic  ramifications  of  recent
research in certain areas of cognitive science (embodied mind theory, extended mind theory).
Second, it shows how the Chicago pragmatists (George H. Mead, John Dewey) not only envisioned
these findings but also how, within certain strains of cognitive science, their work is explicitly
appreciated for important preliminary insights which help us interpret the outcomes of current
research. The argumentative line of the paper revolves around Mead’s and Dewey’s treatment of
the relation between perception and action. Cognition, in the view of the Chicago pragmatists, is
not divisible into atomistic,  ontologically disconnected units but rather should be seen as an
organic circuit within which stimuli and responses are mutually interdependent phases of an
ongoing  goal-directed  active  involvement  of  the  organism  in  the  environmental  structures.
According to Mead and Dewey, as well as the presently burgeoning branch of cognitive science
called the “extended mind theory,” cognition is not something that takes place exclusively in our
heads but should be rather seen as an objective relation between organism and the environment.
On  the  background of  Mead’s  theory  of  the  act  (with  its  four  stages  –  impulse,  perception,
manipulation, and consummation) the author points to certain surprising similarities between
the pragmatists’ treatment of the notion of cognition and ideas recently suggested by defenders
of the extended mind theory.
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